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ESTATE
[L. A. No. 22852.

OF

BLAm

In Bank.

[42 C.2d

Apr. 27, 1954.]

Estate of ALFRED G. BLAIR, Deceased. PHOEBE L.
BONNEN et aI., Respondents, v. NAOMI BLAIR RUOFF
et aI., Appellants.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Family Allowance-Right as Statutory.The right to a family allowance is entirely statutory. (Prob.
Code, § 680.)
[2a,2b] Id. - Family Allowance - Persons Entitled. - While a
family allowance is favored by the law and Prob. Code, § 680,
is liberally construed by courts, such section does not authorize
probate court to make an allowance for benefit of persons
other than those designated therein.
[S] \[d.-Family Allowance-Purpose.-Prob. Code, § 680, authorizing a family allowance, was enacted out of concern for
needs of surviving family during period of readjustment following death of a spouse.
[4] Id.-Family Allowance-Relation to Other Rights.-A family
allowance to meet needs of surviving family is preferred to
most other claims (Prob. Code, § 750), and on proper application it must be granted even if estate is insolvent.
[6] Id.-Family Allowance-Persons Entitled.-Final clause of
Prob. Code, § 680, that in discretion of court a family allowance may be granted retroactively to date of decedent's death,
does not authorize an order granting such allowance to estate
of deceased widow.
[6] Id.-Family Allowance: Probate Homesteads.-The statutes
relating to family allowance (Prob. Code, § 680) and probate
homestead (Prob. Code, § 661) are based on policy that places
welfare of decedent's family above interests of his creditors,
heirs, legatees and devisees; but the rights they confer are
for members of the family only, and persons outside the family
cannot assert them by assignment or succession.
[7] Abatement-Death of Party-Survival of Actions.-Ordinarily
a right that cannot be assigned does not survive death of
}lerson entitled to i t . '

[1] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 367 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 314 et seq.
[7] Sell Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 60; Am.Jur., Abatement and Revival, § 80.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 308; [2] Decedents' Estates, § 320; [3, 4, 10, 11] Decedents' Estates, § 307;
[5] Decedents' Estates, § 313; [6] Decedents' Estates, §§ 307, 313,
376,388; [7J Abatement, § 42; [8J Decedents' Estates, §§ 313, 3SSj
[9j Decedents' Estates, §§ 307, 3Sl.

)

Apr. 1954]

ESTATE OF

BLAm

(42 C.2d 728: 269 P.2d 612)

729

[8] Decedents' Estates - Family Allowance - Persons Entitled:
Probate Homesteads-Persons Entitled.-The right to a family
allowance or probate homestead is lost when the one for whom
it is asked has lost status on which the right depends. (Disapproving Estate of Moore, 170 Cal. 60, 148 P. 205.)
[9] ld.-Family Allowance-Nature of Right: Probate Homesteads
-Nature of Right.-The right to a family allowance or probate homestead is not a vested right, and nothing accrues before the order granting it.
[10] ld.-Family Allowance-When Right Accrues.-Where no
right to a family allowance accrued before death of incompetent widow, none could arise thereafter in favor of her
estate.
[11] ld.-Family Allowance-Effect of Breach of Duty by Guardian.-Where no application for a family allowance was made
during widow's lifetime by either' widow or by guardian appointed after widow was declared incompetent, it is not
necessary to rule that right to such an allowance exists in favor
of her estate to prevent fraud on part of guardian, since
guardian may be held to account in guardianship proceedings
for any alleged failure to preserve his ward's estate by failing
to make a timely application for family allowance.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting a family allowance. Victor R.
Hansen, Judge. Reversed.
Leon U. Everhart, Edward Payson Hart and Montgomery
G. Rice for Appellants.
Harry A. Pines, Adele Walsh and Roy B. Woolsey for
Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-The residuary legatees under the will of
Alfred G. Blair, deceased, appeal from an order granting a
family allowance out of his estate to the estate of his deceased
widow, Susan Ann Blair.
Alfred Blair died testate on July 8, 1950. He left surviving his widow and two adult children by a former marriage,
Naomi Blair Ruoff and Alfred Granville Blair. Mrs. Ruoff
is executrix of the estate. She is also a residuary legatee
under the will. In August, 1950, the widow was declared an
incompetent, and Mrs. Ruoff was appoiuted guardian of her
person and estate. Her estate was sufficient to meet her needs.
The court authorized Mrs. Ruoff to expend from Mrs. Blair's
estate the sum of $500 per month for the widow's maintenance
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and care. No attempt was made before the widow's d('ath
in May, 1951, to secure a family allowance from her hushand's
estate, although the estate was adequate. After Mrs. RIa it '8
death the administratrix of her estate, Phoebe L. Bonnen,
filed a petition for a family allowance. She later resigned,
and Rebecca Riley, her successor and the present administratrix, adopted her petition. The court ordered Mrs. Ruoff,
as executrix, to pay to the administratrix of Mrs. Blair '8
estate $5,216.58, i.e., $500 for each month between the death
of Alfred Blair and the death of the widow.
It is not disputed that the widow could have quaEued for
a family allowance during her lifetime. The issue is whether
the right exists in favor of her estate.
[1] The right to a family allowance, which is entirely
statutory (Estate of King, 19 Ca1.2d 354, 362 [121 P.2d 716] ;
Hills v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 666, 667 [279 P. 805, 65
A.L.R. 266] ; Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 280, 283 [168 P.
117] ), is given by section 680 of the Probate Code: "The
widow, widower, minor children, and adult children who
have been declared incompetent by order of court are entitled
to such reasonable allowance out of the estate as shall be
necessary for their maintenance according to their circumstances, during the progress of the settlement of the estate,
which, in case of an insolvent estate, must not continue longer
than one year after granting letters. Such allowance must
be paid in preference to all other charges, except funeral
charges, expenses of the last illness and expenses of administration, and may, in the discretion of the court or judge
granting it, take effect from the death of the decedent."
[2a] It is true, as respondent asserts that the family allowance is favored by the law and that section 680 is liberally
construed by the courts. The section, however, does not
authorize the probate court to make an allowance in this case
for the benefit of persons other than the widow. [3] It was
enacted out of concern for the n~eds of the surviving family
during the period of readjustment following the death of a
spouse. (Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 280, 284 [168 P. 1171 ;
In re Walkcrly, 77 Cal. 642. 645 [20 P. 150].) [4] The allowance to meet those needs is preferred to most other claims
(Prob. Code, § 750) ; and upon proper application, it must be
granted even if the estate is insolvent. [2b] This highly
preferential position accorded the family allowance is for the
benefit only of persons designated in the statute. (Hil1s v.
Superior Court, 207 Cal. 666, 668 [279 P. 805, 65 A.L.R. 2661·)
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[5] Respondent's claim is based upon the final clause of
the section that in the discretion of the court the allowance
may be granted retroactively to the date of the uecedent's
death. Her contention is that even though the first part
of the section can serve only to provide support for an (;xisting person, the last clause is not so restricted. \Y e fJnd no
basis in the section for this contention. The final clause,
like the preceding ones, describes the scope of the right and
sen'es the same purposes. The section has no application
when there is no person to be maintained and thus no person
to whom the section could apply.
[6] The statutes relating to the family allowance (Prob.
Code, § 680) and the probate homestead (Prob. Code, § 661)
are so close in purpose, effect, and wording that cases construing one are cited authoritatively in cases construing the
other. (Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal.2d 748, 750 [171 P.2d 724].)
Both are based on the policy that places the welfare of the
decedent's surviving family above the interests of his creditors, heirs, legatees, and devisees; but the rights they confer
are for the members of the family only, persons outside the
family cannot assert them by assignment or succession.
Altbough the precise question in this case is one of first
instance, it has been held that rights similar to the right to
a family allowance abate on the death of the widow. In
Estate of Bachelder. 123 Cal. 466, 467 [56 P. 971. the widow's
right under former section 1469 of the ,Code of Civil Procedure, now Probate Code section 645, to have a small estate
set apart to her "for the use and support of the family"
was held to be a personal right that did not survive her death.
In Estate of Moore, 57 Cal. 437, it was held that the widow's
right to have a probate homestead set apart to her was nonassignable and that no one can succeed to the right to have
a probate homestead set apart. "If a widow die before applying for a probate homestead, any right to apply which she
might have had is gone; no person succeeds to that right .... "
(57 Cal. 437, 445.) [7] Ordinarily a right that cannot be
assigned does not survive the death of the person entitled
to it. (California Packing Corp. v. Lopez, 207 Cal. 600 [279
P. 664, 64 A.L.R. 1412] ; Wikstrom v. Yolo Fliers Club, 206
Cal. 461 [274 P. 959] ; see 1 Am.Jur., "Abatement and Revival," § 80; 1 C.J.S., "Abatement and Revival," § 132.)
In In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73 r45 P. 1023], on which respondent
relies, the widow died pending an appeal from an order grant-
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ing her an allowance. The court held that since the order
was properly granted before the widow's death, her estate
could recover sums that had accrued under it during her lifetime. In the present case there was no order grantin.g a
family allowance, and thus no money due or accrued under
a valid order during the lifetime of the widow.
Respondent invokes Estate of Brooks, 28 Ca1.2d 748 [171
P.2d 724], and Estate of Moore, 170 Cal. 60 [148 P. 205],
for the proposition that conditions that exist at the time of
the decedent's death and not those existing later determine
whether or not a family allowance can be granted. The Brooks
case held that to qualify for either a family allowance or a
probate homestead, the widow must be entitled to support
from her husband at the time of his death. The case did
not hold that the right to an allowance may not be lost by
events occurring thereafter. The Moore case involved the
right to a family allowance of a widow who remarried after
her husband's death. An order was entered after the widow's
remarriage granting an allowance for the period between
the husband'. death and the widow's remarriage. Subsequently the court entered an order settling the administrator's account in which he claimed credit for amounts paid
pursuant to the order for family allowance. The Moore
case is not directly in point. It did not involve the question
whether the right to a family allowance can survive the death
of the widow (cf. Estate of Bachelder, supra, 123 Cal. 466,
467). Moreover, it involved a collateral attack on the order
for family allowance (Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328, 333
[100 P.2d 1045] ; Estate of Nolan, 145 Cal. 559, 561 [79 P.
428] ), and it was therefore necessary to decide only if the
court had jurisdiction. In Rountree v. Montague, 30 Cal.
App. 170, 177-178 [157 P. 623], it was held that the question
of status does not go to the jurisdiction of the court and t.bat
an order setting aside a probate homestead to a remarried
widow, although erroneous, was not subject to collateral attack. The Rountree case also indicated that the same rule
applied to an order for family allowance. (30 Cal.App. 170,
179.) [8] The rationale of the decision in the Moore case, however, is inconsistent with the long established rule that the
right to a family allowance or probate homestead is lost when
the one for whom it is asked has lost the status upon which
the right depends (Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454, 457-459
[166 P. 11, 3 A.L.R. 1396] ; Estate of Heywood, 149 Cat. 129,
130-131 [84 P. 834] ; In re Still, 117 Cal. 509, 514 [49 P. 4631;
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Estate of Hamilton, 66 Cal. 576 [6 P. 493] ; Estate of Moore,
57 Cal. 437,443; Estate of Boland, 43 Cal. 640, 643; Estate of
Gosnell, 63 Cal.App.2d 38. 39 [146 P.2d 42]), and is therefore
disapproved.
Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo.App. 91 [89 S.W.2d
153, 158], on which respondent relies, involved a Missouri
statute in which the right to "maintenance becomes vested
in the surviving spouse immediately upon the death of the
mate. " [9] In California. however. it is well established
that the right to a family allowance or probate homestead is
not a vested right and that nothing accrues before the order
granting it. (Estate of Pillsbury, 175 Cal. 454. 457 [166
P. 11, 3 A.L.R. 1396] ; Estate of Heywood, 149 Cal. 129, 130131 [84 P. 834] ; In re Lux, 114 Cal. 73, 87 [45 P. 1023];
Estate of Boland, 43 Cal. 640, 642; Estate of Shapero, 39
Cal.App.2d 144, 146 [102 P.2d 569].)
Respondent relies on Mead v. Phillips, 135 F.2d 819, to
support her contention that whatever the rule may be as to
a competent widow, the right of an incompetent widow to
a family allowance must be held to survive her death. The
court held that a statute requiring the widow to renounce
rights under the will or lose her common law rights did not
apply to an incompetent widow. Just as in the Monahan
case, mpra, the court was considering rights that vested in
the widow on her husband's death and survived her own
death, and the court held that her inability to make an election within the statutory period because of incompetence did
not defeat the power of the court to make the election for
her after her death. [10] As noted above, however, in the present case no right accrued before the death of the widow, and
none could arise thereafter. [11] Moreover, it is not necessary to rule in favor of the administratrix to prevent -fraud
on the part of the guardian. The guardian may be held to
account in the guardianship proceedings for any alleged failure to preserve his ward's estate by failing to make a timely
application for family allowance. Respondent's contention
that Estates of Boyes, 151 Cal. 143 [90 P. 454], precludes
surcharging the guardian's account is unfounded. In that
ease the written objections to the guardian's accounts contained no suggestion of any claim that it was the guardian's
duty to obtain a family allowance for his wards and that
be('anse of his failure to do so he could not be allowed any
Cl"edit for payments out of the wards' estates. The court
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held that evidence in support of this claim was inadmissible
since the right of the contestants to surcharge the accounts
was limited to those matters set up as grounds of contest
in the written objections. (151 Cal. 143, 147.) The court
also held that the question whether the guardian-administrator
had breached a duty as administrator in failing to secure a
family allowance for the wards could not be raised in exceptions to his guardianship accounts (151 Cal. 143, 152). It
did not hold that his alleged breach of duty as guardian could
not be so raised.
is reversed.
The order
......
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and Bray, J. pro tem.,· concurred.

